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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The parties should bear their own respective costs and attorney’s fees in this 
action.  Neither party prevailed on their affirmative claims in Juvenile Court for 
termination of parental rights and each prevailed in their counter defense.  Rocio is not 
legally or equitably entitled to approximately $188,000 in attorney fees and costs, plus 
interest, at Aaron’s added and overwhelming expense in the Juvenile Court matter as now 
unfairly claimed by her counsel.  The District Court later summarily ordered an extreme 
one-sided award based on mistaken assumptions and errors, which this Court of Appeals 
is respectfully asked to correct.  
After the Juvenile Court closed the case and terminated its jurisdiction, the District 
Court later accepted and followed counsel for Rocio’s erroneous suggestion that the 
Juvenile Court had issued a valid prior award for recovery of fees, costs and expenses in 
an unspecified amount.   However, no such order occurred and no deference thereto is 
warranted or required. To do so, would cause and mandate a most unfair and inequitable  
outcome.   
To support the alleged Juvenile Court order regarding attorney’s fees, there was no 
formal motion by Rocio’s counsel and no documentation and no hearing or oral argument 
or due process as is required to invoke the lower court’s consideration of such a request. 
Only after the matter was appealed by Aaron to this court did counsel for Rocio seek to 
go back and file such a motion, after the fact.  Said attempt and filing merely serves as a 
further admission of the absence thereof at any time previous.  Even as wrongly filed, 
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there was still no allocation or proper documentation or identification of prevailing or 
non-prevailing claims and recoverable or non-recoverable fees and costs. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that important procedural requirements to  
recover attorney fees are often overlooked by courts and practitioners and receive only 
cursory attention. See Dixie State Bank v Bracken, 764 P. 2d 985, 989, n.6 (Utah 1988).  
If a party has properly requested attorney fees and raised the issue, the other party must 
have full opportunity to meet it.  Palombi v. D & C Builders, 452 P.2d 328 (Utah 1969).  
A party requesting an award of attorney fees has the burden of presenting evidence 
sufficient to support the award.  Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 893 (Utah 1996); 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992).  When a party does not 
provide such evidence and even if indisputably entitled to recover attorney’s fees, they 
may not recover at all and even if there is no disputed issue of material fact. Dixie, supra 
at 988-89; Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichart, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). “[A]n award made without adequate supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and must be overruled.” Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 103 (Utah 1983). 
“Even if there were no disputed issue of material fact, the summary judgment would not 
award attorneys fee without a stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted affidavit, or 
evidence given as to the value thereof.” Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 
1039, 1040 (Utah 1975).   
 A party’s failure to provide the court with sufficient evidence or failure to 
properly allocate between recoverable and non-recoverable fees, may result in a 
denial of the fee award altogether. Dixie, supra at 988-90; Regional Sales, supra at 
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1210, 1216; Bangerter, supra at 100, 103; Freed Finance Co., supra at 1039, 1040. A 
party is entitled only to those fees resulting from its principal cause of action for which 
there is a contractual or statutory obligation for such fees. Utah Farm Production Credit 
Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981). Attorney fees awarded under the terms of a 
contract may not allow recovery of any and all fees generated in a lawsuit. In the same 
way, attorney fees awarded under a statute will not allow an award of fees incurred in 
pursuit of some other grounds or statutory claims. Graco Fishing v. Ironwood 
Exploration, 766 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Utah 1988). The party requesting attorney fees 
has the burden of allocating between the various claims brought before the court. 
Cottonwood Mall, supra, 830 P.2d at 269-70.  If a party fails to differentiate between 
recoverable and unrecoverable attorney fees, they may forfeit the award entirely at the 
trial court’s discretion.  Utah Farm Prod., supra; Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 
910 P.2d 1252, 1266 n.15 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Id., (citing Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 
1384, 1394 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
 The court must make written findings of fact explaining the grounds for the award 
and why the amount awarded constitutes a reasonable and recoverable fee. Hall v. Hall, 
858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The only established exception is when all 
the relevant facts are undisputed as with a motion for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Id. at 
1018, 1025; Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 165-168. (Utah 1989).  This matter 
is definitely a disputed claim.  Courts may fail to make findings in support of an award of 
attorney fees or make findings, which properly reflect the appropriate factors and thus 
require the case to be remanded after appeal. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 266 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In re 
Estate of Quinn, 784 P.2d 1238, 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).   See also Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 643, 649, n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Sorensen 
v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 832 (Utah Ct. App. Ct. 1989). To withstand Appellate review, 
findings should be as detailed as findings supporting a damage award. Brown v. Richards, 
840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
 An award made without adequate supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and must be overruled. Bangerter supra, at 103; Mountain States Broad., 776 
P.2d 643, 649 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (and noting that a “reasonable fee” will only 
compensate party for those fees expended upon issues where the party prevailed); Graco 
Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration, 766 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Utah 1988) remanding for 
allocation of attorney fees between those incurred in pursuit of successful claims under 
one statute and unsuccessful claims pursued under another statute.  See also Utah Farm 
Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981) wherein the court found no abuse 
of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to award any attorney fees and where the party 
requesting the fees failed to distinguish between time spent prosecuting its complaint and 
the portion spent in defending against the counterclaim. See also Selvage v. J.J. Johnson 
& Assoc., 910 P.2d 1252, 1266, n.15 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) noting that it may be proper to 
deny a request for attorney fees if the requesting party fails to allocate in accord with the 
directive in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268-270 (Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 10, 2012, after the conclusion of the trial on the competing 
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petitions filed by Aaron and Rocio seeking termination of each other’s parental rights 
regarding their two children, E.H. and N.H., the Juvenile Court announced, sua sponte, its 
intent to award attorney fees, costs and expenses to Rocio.  
2. Before the September 10, 2012 hearing, Rocio did not file a written motion 
for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses.  Rocio has failed to identify and verify in a court 
transcript when any oral suggestion or request to award fees, costs and expenses was made 
(and such fails to meet the applicable standard regardless).  Also, any request made for 
attorney fees, costs or expenses in the counter-petition filed by Rocio are not in the record. 
3. Over the ensuing period of nearly eight months, Rocio’s counsel never filed 
a motion with supporting affidavit and documentation to warrant such an award of fees, 
costs and expenses and no hearing or oral argument was ever held as well. 
4.  On April 29, 2013, the Juvenile Court entered its “2013 Final Juvenile 
Order”.  There was no pending motion, proffer, affidavit or supporting evidence by 
Rocio’s counsel at the time of the court’s final rulings.   
5. On May 13, 2013, Aaron and his wife, Jennica, filed their Notice of Appeal 
regarding the April 29, 2013, Juvenile Court decision.  (Record at 0844-0846). 
6. On May 15, 2013 and while Aaron’s Appeal was then pending, Rocio went 
back and filed (after the fact) a motion and affidavit in Juvenile Court.  She claimed 
entitlement to attorney fees, costs and expenses in the prior proceedings in Juvenile 
Court, which were then under review by the Court of Appeals.  At the same time, Rocio 
elected to not file a cross-appeal and did not seek to identify and determine an amount of 
fees, costs and expenses to which she claimed to be entitled. 
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7. On June 4, 2013, Rocio filed a memorandum objecting to the Petition for 
Appeal filed by Aaron.  In her request for appellate fees, she acknowledged that no 
attorney fees were awarded in the lower court and she asked only for attorney fees to be 
ordered for having to respond to the Appeal.  No attorney fees were ordered to be paid to 
Rocio by this Court. 
8. On September 6, 2013, this Court issued its ruling regarding Aaron’s 
Appeal and it states: 1 
[W]e vacate the findings of contempt and the sanctions imposed, and 
remand for a hearing on the allegations of contempt. The Juvenile Court's 
order is affirmed in all respects except for the determination of contempt, 
the findings of contempt are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the 
Juvenile Court for a hearing on the contempt allegations.2 
 
No authority was given for the Juvenile Court to later award attorney fees, costs or 
expenses on remand except in the context of possible contempt sanctions to be 
determined.  (That also did not occur as the Court completed its remand hearing and 
issued its order).  
9. After holding a remand hearing on December 13, 2014 as directed by this 
Court, the Juvenile Court executed an order on January 23, 2014.  It states how the 
remand from this Court was satisfied.  The Court of Appeals had already vacated all of 
the Juvenile Court’s earlier contempt findings and ordered sanctions.  On remand, 
contempt charges and sanctions were limited to two minor charges and a total fine of 
                                                     
1 See State of Utah ex. rel. E.S. and N.S., A.S. and J.S. v. State of  Utah and R.S., 2013 UT 
App 222, 319 P.3d 744. (hereinafter “In re E.S”.)   
2 In re E.S., 2013 UT App 222 ¶¶ 8-9, 319 P.3d 744.  
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$1,000.  No attorney fees, costs or expenses and no further sanctions were awarded.    
10. The Final Juvenile Court Order was issued on March 17, 2014.  No 
attorney fees, costs or expenses were awarded. No post judgment appeal was filed by 
Rocio.  
11. After the Juvenile Court terminated its jurisdiction, Rocio filed in District 
Court on May 6, 2014 a new motion for attorney fees, costs and expenses previously 
charged in the Juvenile Court.  The accompanying documents were identical to what she 
filed in Juvenile Court and which were not acted upon. 
12. On May 6, 2014, Rocio moved the District Court, pursuant to the April 29, 
2013 order of the Juvenile Court, to reduce the alleged award of attorney fees and costs to 
a monetary judgment.  R. 472 – 591.   Aaron objected to the unfair and untimely 
consideration of such fees, costs and expenses. 
13. On November 26, 2014, the Honorable Thomas R. Patton heard oral 
argument on Rocio’s motion.  R. 641. Commissioner Patton announced that he 
understood that the Juvenile Court had previously ordered attorney fees and he felt that 
he lacked authority as a Commissioner to make any changes. Rather, the matter would be 
certified to the District Court judge for his review and further consideration.     
14. On January 12, 2015, the Honorable Fred D. Howard heard oral argument 
on both Aaron’s objection to the Commissioner’s recommendation and Rocio’s District 
Court motion for attorney fees and costs alleged in the earlier Juvenile Court proceedings.  
R. 701. 
15. The District Court originally issued a ruling that presupposed the request 
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for attorney fees, costs and expenses was timely filed within a 14 day deadline as 
provided in U.R.C.P. Rule 54(d) regarding costs.  The District Court accepted without 
question or analysis the prior presumed rulings of the Juvenile Court regarding the 
criteria and provisions included in Utah Code §30-3-3 and the parties’ original Divorce 
Decree.  
16. When it became apparent through a subsequent motion by Aaron filed in 
District Court that Rocio’s request for attorney fees, costs and expenses was not, in fact, 
filed within 14 days, the Court issued a second opinion and  changed its stated 
justification for awarding attorney’s fees. This time, it relied solely on the criteria found 
in Utah Code § 30-3-3 and a general possibility of attorney fees awarded in actions 
brought to enforce a Divorce Decree. 
II 
ARGUMENT 
 
            The trial court's decision to award attorney fees is a question of law to be 
reviewed for correctness.3  
A. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT APPLY LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO 
MAKE AN AWARD OF FEES AND COSTS  
 
The attorney fees, costs and expenses alleged and relied upon by Rocio were first 
awarded pre-appeal by the Juvenile Court as part of an unlawful and unfair imposition of 
sanctions for contempt and without notice and hearing. These were later vacated by the 
mandate of this Court.  Nothing that was done by the Juvenile Court after the September 
                                                     
3 Keith Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128,¶ 11, 26 P.3d 872.  
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10, 2013 Ruling of this Court supports or justifies the District Court’s later reliance on  
presumed findings of the Juvenile Court pursuant to Utah Code §30-3-3 or the parties’ 
divorce decree as now alleged by Rocio.  The provisions of the original divorce decree 
between Aaron and Rocio do not apply and do not confer such authority on the Juvenile 
Court.  Rocio also falsely asserts that some prior floating and unverified “oral motion” for 
attorney fees effectively roamed throughout the Juvenile Court proceedings as an effective 
“blank check” to be signed by the court at any time and without explanation and without 
due process. That is simply not the case.  Respectfully, the Juvenile Court either did not 
possess or exercise actual authority to award fees, costs and expenses or attempted to 
exercise authority that it did not have.  This Court is asked to not uphold and perpetuate 
the mistaken assumptions, which have denied the full and fair due process to which Aaron 
is entitled.  
1. Other Lawful Options Were Also Not Applicable And Not Adopted  
The Juvenile Court may award attorney fees, costs and expenses independent of a 
finding of contempt.  The Court could have relied on "the inherent powers of the Court to 
promote the integrity and dignity of the Court; and to direct and control its officers for the 
regulation of the business of the Court."4 The Juvenile Court did not do so.  The Juvenile 
Court may award attorney fees for violation of U.R.C.P. Rule 11 as well as successfully 
defending against a claim that U.R.C.P. Rule 11 has been violated.5  The Juvenile Court 
did not do so.  After notice and opportunity for hearing, the Juvenile Court could make a 
                                                     
4 State ex rel. P.R., 2011 UT App 65 ¶ 3, 249 P.3d 595 (footnote omitted.) 
5 K.F.K. v. T.W., 2005 UT App 85 ¶ 2, 110 P.3d 162.  
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finding of contempt “that was criminal in nature as a vindication of the court's authority, 
and assess a fine as a penalty … [that] was incorporated into the final order dismissing the 
petition and terminating jurisdiction.”6 Again, the Court did not do so. 
2. A Joint Undefined Award of Fees, Costs and Expenses for Contempt 
Was Eliminated By This Court 
 
 The fees, costs and expenses that Rocio seeks to recover were vacated by this 
Court.  Neither notice nor meaningful opportunity to be heard were provided before 
findings of contempt and sanctions were imposed by the Juvenile Court.    
The Juvenile Court made undefined findings regarding fees pursuant to Utah Code 
30-3-3(1)7 and (2)8 as well as the parties’ original divorce decree. 9  An undefined amount 
of fees, costs and expenses were awarded against both Aaron and stepmother Jennica, as 
a matter of joint and several liability.  They were specifically referred to as contempt 
findings or sanctions.10  If Aaron and Jennica were to be jointly liable, the undefined 
amount of fees could only have been regarding contempt since unlike Aaron, Jennica was 
not a party to any divorce proceeding or decree involving Rocio.  There are no other 
award of attorney fees and costs in the 2013 Final Juvenile Court Order. 
On December 13, 2014, Juvenile Court Senior Judge Sterling Sainsbury held a 
hearing on remand regarding contempt. (Record at 0882.) On January 23, 2014, Judge 
Sainsbury executed an Order detailing how he fulfilled the mandate of this Court.  No 
                                                     
6 In re D.A.J., 2015 UT App 74 ¶ 8, 347 P.3d 430. 
7 See 2013 Final Juvenile Order, ¶¶ 150, 162. 
8 Id., ¶¶ 150, 159. 
9 Id., ¶¶ 151. 159. 
10 Id., ¶¶ 192-193, 205, 208. 
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fees, costs or expenses were awarded in favor Rocio and against Aaron.  The Juvenile 
Court indicated it had not entertained the motion for attorney fees, costs and expenses 
filed by Rocio and terminated the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. The Court could not 
act in the manner moved by Rocio after entering its Order confirming that it lacked 
jurisdiction. “[O]nce the termination petition was dismissed and the juvenile court's 
jurisdiction ended, …the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce any prior order or agreement. 
See, In re B.B., 2004 UT 39, ¶ 16, 94 P.3d 252.”11  
B. THE “AFFIRMED IN ALL RESPECTS” ELEMENT OF THIS COURT’S 
PRIOR RULING DOES NOT SUPPORT OR JUSTIFY A LATER AWARD  
AS ASSERTED BY ROCIO 
 
Rocio presupposes that the District Court may simply enter an amount of fees, 
costs and expenses whenever and however because of certain summary language from 
the Juvenile Court in its 2013 Final Order. The same also applies to this Court’s prior 
opinion as cited previously herein. 12   The controlling standards are much more specific 
and substantial.   Further, as emphasized herein, all prior references to potential attorney 
fees by the Juvenile Court were in the context of contempt sanction, which were vacated 
and not reinstated on remand. The isolated excerpt from this Court’s ruling and the earlier 
Juvenile Court are not sufficient to create and confer blanket entitlement by Rocio to an 
award of fees, costs and expenses by either the Juvenile or the District Court. 
1. A General Affirmation Cannot Take the Place of the Requirement of  
Specified Fees, Costs or Expenses 
 
                                                     
11 In re D.A.J., 2015 UT App 74 ¶ 7, 347 P.3d 430. 
12 In re E.S., 2013 UT App 222 ¶¶ 8-9, 319 P.3d 744 (emphasis added.) 
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 The  general language cited and applied out of context by Rocio does not excuse 
the absence or take the place of the required specific allocation and designation of 
attorney fees, costs and expenses in the 2013 Final Juvenile Order. Since the Order was 
final, there would be no opportunity or ability to change or amend that which was 
allegedly affirmed.  This was especially apparent because of the limited scope of remand 
from this Court.  No attorney fees could be awarded without identifying and including 
them as a matter of contempt.  This did not occur and no appeal was taken by Rocio to 
challenge the Juvenile Court’s decision not to do so.  
 2. Rocio Waived Fees, Costs and Expenses   
[¶16] A prevailing party waives the right to attorney fees upon "the signed entry of 
final judgment or order, at which time trial issues become ripe for appeal and a party may 
file a timely notice of appeal pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." 
Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1998); see also DFI Props, LLC 
v. GR 2 Enters, LLC, 2010 UT 61, ¶ 18, 242 P.3d 781 (explaining that the requirement 
that the prevailing party submit a request for attorney fees before the entry of a final 
judgment prevents “piecemeal appeals" because otherwise "every case involving attorney 
fees could potentially be the genesis of two separate appeals--one appeal related to the 
merits and one appeal related to the attorney fees award" (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).13  
Rocio’s failure to file a motion for an award of fees and costs during the 
                                                     
13 Westmont Mirador LLC v. Shurtliff, 2014 UT App 184 ¶ 16, 333 P.3d 369. 
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intervening nearly eight months between the conclusion of the trial and the Juvenile 
Court’s 2013 Order constitutes a waiver of the right to do so.  Utah Code §30-3-3(4) 
confirms the essential element of completion of all related orders and the final order or 
judgment. “Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment 
may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment.”   
3. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Award Fees Absent An Amount 
Certain from the Juvenile Court 
 
Without the Juvenile Court’s prior determination of the specific amount, the 
District Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim of Rocio.  In the 
2014 case of Zelig v. Uintah County, a statute granted the Juvenile Court authority to 
determine the amount of the expert witness fee for the party responsible for paying the 
fee:  
Therefore, we conclude that the Juvenile Court – the court that appointed 
the expert in the first place – is the appropriate court to determine the 
reasonableness of the work Doctor Zelig performed, his fee, and determine 
who was responsible for payment. … We, therefore, also conclude that in 
the instant case, and the time and the posture it was brought, was never 
properly before the district court. We therefore vacate its judgment.14 
 
In similar manner, the Juvenile Court in this case had “sole responsibility for 
setting the amount” of attorney’s fees, costs and expenses applicable to termination of 
parental rights proceedings over which it had sole, exclusive jurisdiction.  As such, “the 
District Court thus lacked jurisdiction over the limited dispute-at least until that important 
step had been taken.”15   
                                                     
14 Zelig v. Uintah County, 2014 UT App 69 ¶¶ 7,9, 323 P.3d 610. 
15  Id. at ¶ 6. 
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C. DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IS REVERSIBLE ERROR  
Rocio relies on Keith Jorgensen’s Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 
128 to justify a complete failure and refusal to allocate fees, costs and expenses.  This 
argument is in error. This Court has clarified as follows: 
[I]n other contexts we have held that the failure to allocate attorney fees 
between compensable and non-compensable claims constitutes grounds for 
complete denial. See Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall, 2001 UT App 
128,¶ 32, 26 P.3d 872.16  
 
An award of fees under Utah Code § 30-3-3(1) " must be based on the usual 
factors of need, ability to pay, and reasonableness." 17  Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) does 
not eliminate the requirement of the ability to pay nor can the Decree.18  Aaron 
requested a hearing to be heard on these matters and was denied. 
 The District Court in the early divorce and custody proceeding found sufficient 
evidence of apparent sexual abuse involving Rocio that sole custody was awarded to 
Aaron.  He was then advised by his counsel at that time to petition in Juvenile Court 
for termination of Rocio’s parental rights.  Rocio chose to respond with a similar 
petition of her own and on different grounds.  Obviously, defending against Aaron’s 
claims following the state’s earlier review of potential sexual abuse is completely 
different from the burden of demonstrating an alternate basis for her proposed 
termination of Aaron’s parental rights.  
                                                     
16 Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318 ¶ 43, 35 P.3d 341. 
17 See Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 28, 233 P.3d 836 (citations omitted.) 
18 See Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah 1978) ("It 
has always been recognized that a contract contains, implicitly, the laws existing at the 
time it is completed."). 
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  A possible exception to this rule requires a “common core” of legal theories 
and facts. This clearly does not apply to competing petitions to terminate parental 
rights.  
CONCLUSION 
Rocio is not entitled to an award of attorney fees, costs and expenses: 1) No 
specified amount of fees, costs or expenses was ever identified or determined by the 
Juvenile Court;  2) Any award of attorney fees, costs or expenses by the Juvenile 
Court was a form of contempt sanctions, which were later vacated by this Court and 
were not adopted or reinstated by the Juvenile Court on remand; 3) The District Court 
lacked independent authority under Utah Code §30-3-3 and original Divorce Decree 
and with no formal motion in Juvenile Court to later create and issue its own award 
regarding proceedings prior to and outside its own jurisdiction; 4) There has never 
been a proper allocation of the alleged fees and costs or identification of prevailing 
and non-prevailing claims and parties and recoverable and non-recoverable fees and 
expenses;  5) There has also been a fundamental denial of due process before such a 
large and overwhelming financial obligation can be fairly or reasonably imposed 
solely on Aaron when, as with Rocio, he too, prevailed in his defense and neither 
party prevailed in their respective affirmative claims. 6) Even if Utah Code § 30-3-3 
applied, Aaron was denied the right to present evidence of inability to pay the award. 
DATED June 17, 2016    Law Office of F. LaVar Christensen 
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